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I.  Introduction 
A key feature of democracy is the accountability provided by voters, who choose 
whether to re-elect a politician or party based on demonstrated performance. Recent 
evidence suggests, however, that voters may punish politicians even for events outside 
their control. For example, Achen and Bartels (2004) find that leaders are punished for 
droughts, floods, and even shark attacks that occur under their watch. In a similar vein, 
Wolfers (2006) and Leigh (2009) show that incumbent politicians are rewarded or 
punished for movements in the economy outside their plausible sphere of influence. This 
behavior violates most basic models of democratic accountability and has been advanced 
as evidence of voter irrationality. An inability to correctly distinguish political 
competence from exogenous shocks outside the control of a politician would imply 
weaker democratic accountability, and may reduce governmental incentives to pursue 
welfare-maximizing policies. 
On the other hand, a bad shock does not necessarily imply political disaster for 
incumbent politicians. In India, for example, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader 
Jagdish Shettigar remarked that “a bad monsoon per se will not affect electoral fortunes, 
but its management definitely will.” A food shortage tested the “administrative skills” of 
the government. Shettigar noted that the BJP lost a round of elections in Delhi in 1998, in 
the so-called “onion crisis,” not because of the severe drought, but because the 
government was perceived to have handled the crisis poorly.1  
This example suggests an omitted analysis from recent papers that have attempted 
to demonstrate failures in electoral accountability by showing that voters respond to 
random events: the government’s response to the external shock. After all, governments 
can take action to mitigate the effects of droughts, assist flood victims, and respond to 
external shocks to the economy to the benefit of local consumers and business. Indeed, it 
is entirely possible that voters are able to infer more about government competence by 
observing state response to a crisis than they can from other indicators like movements in 
the business cycle or the budget deficit, which are plagued with multiple inference 
challenges (Drazen, 2000). In the context of the United States, Healy and Malhotra 
                                                 
1 “How Ballot Hopes Rest on Good Monsoon,” Financial Express, April 21, 2003. 
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(2009) demonstrate that voters respond to natural disaster relief efforts, although the 
implied electoral incentives for elected officials appear to still fall well short of public 
welfare maximization. 
In this paper, we use weather crises in India to examine the hypothesis that voters 
respond to events beyond a government’s control; our framework explicitly incorporates 
the fact that voters also evaluate the government’s response to exogenous events. 
Specifically, we look at the decisions that Indian voters make in state elections, using the 
quality of the monsoon rains as an exogenous shock to welfare. We note several 
advantages of our setting. India’s size and history yield a large sample size: there have 
been over 21,000 elections in over 25 states, spanning nearly a quarter century. The 
overwhelming majority of the population is involved in agriculture, and the quality of 
seasonal rains, are incredibly important to household welfare. Rainfall shocks, clearly 
beyond the control of politicians, are measured accurately over a long time series. 
Moreover, the Indian government statistics on state-level disaster relief expenditures are 
of unusually high quality for a developing country. This enables precise estimation, as 
well as the flexibility to explore heterogeneous treatment effects and non-linear 
relationships. 
In addition, we build on the small body of work beginning with Sen (1981) that 
explores governmental response to weather crises in India. Besley and Burgess (2002) 
show that state governments in India are responsive to agricultural and weather-induced 
catastrophes, but that the degree of response depends on the sophistication of the voters. 
Specifically, they find that state governments increase public food distribution and 
calamity relief expenditures more when their electorates are characterized by higher 
literacy rates and greater newspaper circulation. Building on this research, we analyze the 
government response in a framework that acknowledges the potential for voter 
irrationality. Our paper seeks to make three contributions to the existing literature: we 
examine whether voters reward governments for responsiveness during weather crises; 
we identify specific behavioral biases, including the attribution bias and the recency bias 
that an electorate seems to collectively display; and we examine whether governments 
respond strategically to voter behavior. 
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Our paper first establishes that rainfall is an important determinant of agricultural 
output, a result that is not surprising given the low level of irrigation across most of our 
sample. We then confirm, in the Indian context, the basic findings of Achen and Bartels 
(2004) that elected officials fare worse when natural disaster strikes. We show that, on 
average, incumbent parties that run for re-election get punished for bad weather, losing 
more than three percent of the vote for each standard deviation that district-level rainfall  
deviates from its optimum level. This effect is driven almost entirely by the response of 
voters to the ruling coalition, as incumbents are only significantly punished when they are 
part of that coalition.  
We then attempt to test the “Shettigar” theory, allowing the voters to condition 
their response on the government’s management of the crisis. The analysis is motivated 
by a reduced-form framework that treats the government’s response to an exogenous 
shock as a useful and potentially less-noisy piece of information with which voters can 
evaluate the competence of the government. Several hypotheses motivated by the 
framework are tested. 
We confirm that governments do increase the level of disaster relief to areas hit 
by rainfall shocks. Next, we test whether voters reward governments that increase 
disaster spending in response to extreme rainfall. Our results are strong and significant: 
incumbents fare better when they respond to a crisis with emergency relief. However, we 
estimate that governments that respond to crises with an average increase in relief 
spending are able to make up votes equivalent to only one-seventh the punishment from 
having presided during a crisis in the first place. 
Finally, we investigate voter and politician behavior with respect to a simple 
behavioral bias, the propensity for voters to respond only to those events and outcomes 
that occur soon before an election (e.g., Fair 1978). Since governments are in power for 
several years, we compare the electoral response of voters to rainfall shocks in various 
years of the election cycle. As it turns out, voters only reward governments for their relief 
in the season leading up to the election. This result poses a challenge to our reduced-form 
framework that suggests governments can only gain through vigorous response. We 
explore the consequences of a strategic government response to rainfall shocks, and test 
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for such behavior around election timing. The results indicate that governments respond 
to the voter recency bias by delivering more crisis relief during election years. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II constructs a formal model 
in which voters respond to governmental relief efforts at the polls. Section III summarizes 
the context of the political system in India and related research, while Section IV 
describes our data set and empirical specifications. Using the Indian data, Section V 
replicates and extends the tests of previous papers, analyzing the effect of rainfall on crop 
yields and voting outcomes. It then tests how governments respond to crises, and how 
voters evaluate their responses. Section VI tests specifically for a particular behavioral 
bias among Indian voters, recency bias, and examines whether governments strategically 
respond to this bias. Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  Modeling Voters 
To clarify what may be learned from voter behavior following rainfall shocks, we 
lay out a simple two-period model, in which voters use observable information to form an 
opinion of the politicians unobservable competence. Our model is similar to the career 
concerns model in Persson and Tabellini (1998) and the models in Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988) and Rogoff (1990), but simpler insofar as we consider an environment without 
strategic action. 
We focus on voters’ desires to evaluate an official’s performance based on the 
information available to them at the time. Our model makes two important predictions: 
first, contrary to what is often casually stated in the literature, voters may rationally 
“punish” politicians for bad weather, if they cannot perfectly identify the extent to which 
the weather shock is responsible for income losses or gains. Second, the model predicts, 
under certain information structures, that all politicians may be hurt by adverse weather, 
but higher-quality governments may be hurt less, as they signal their type through the 
quality of their response to a crisis. 
We start by outlining a textbook example. Consider an initially homogenous 
voting population, who earns income y, which is a function of the ability of the politician, 
θ, a random weather shock, ν, and an idiosyncratic shock ε: 
y = θ + ν + ε     (1) 
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Voters seek to reelect a politician if she is of sufficiently high quality, otherwise 
they prefer to vote against the incumbent and replace her with a new politician, who we 
assume is also drawn from an (independent) uniform [0,1] distribution.2 We assume that 
the rainfall shock is a negative shock to income that is distributed uniformly on [-1,0]. 
Finally, we also assume that the idiosyncratic shock is drawn from a uniform [0,1] 
distribution.  
If the weather shock is perfectly observed, E[θ|y,v]=(y-v)/2. This relationship is 
depicted in Panel A of Figure 1. This relationship yields the following result: 
Result 1: If income is additive in ability, the rainfall shock, and an idiosyncratic 
shock, and weather is perfectly observable, then . For a politician of a 
fixed ability, the probability of re-election is invariant to the quality of rainfall. 
In contrast, voters may either not perfectly observe the rain or, more plausibly, be 
imperfectly informed about the extent to which the rainfall shock affects income. If we 
assume instead that the weather shock is unobservable, then E[θ|y]=1/3+y/3. The 
relationship is depicted in Panel B of Figure 1. 
Result 2: If income is additive in ability, the rainfall shock, and an idiosyncratic 
shock, and weather is unobservable, then . For a politician of a fixed ability, 
the probability of re-election increases with the quality of the weather. 
Note that an intermediate case, in which shocks are imperfectly observed, will 
yield the same prediction as in Result 2: since the shock is not perfectly observed, voters 
rationally downgrade their expectation of the politician’s competence when observed 
income is lower.  
Of course, government intervention may be able to ameliorate some of the 
negative effect of a rainfall shock: for example, through disaster relief spending, 
distribution of emergency food grains, or other measures. We now consider the 
                                                 
2 The standard for re-election is typically posited to be .5, the mean of the distribution of politician quality, 
though this need not be the case, if, for example, ideological considerations also matter. If voters have an 
ideological preference for the incumbent party, for example, they may decline to reelect a politician only if 
her expected ability is less than .4. The exact cutoff is not important for the results we derive; we only need 
the probability of reelection to be weakly increasing in expected ability. 
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implications of a somewhat richer model, in which the politician’s ability plays an 
important role in determining the impact of rainfall shocks on income. 
In particular, we continue to assume that weather is unobserved and that the 
income process is as follows: 
y = θ + (1-θ)*ν +ε     (2) 
In this case, the highest ability politician is able to completely neutralize the effect 
of a rainfall shock, while the worst quality politician is entirely ineffective in mitigating a 
shock. We again consider the case when weather is observable, and the case when it is 
not. We maintain the assumption that θ and ε are uniformly distributed on the interval 
(0,1) and that ν is distributed on the interval (-1,0), meaning the range of possible income 
is again   -1 to 2. 
If the weather shock is not observed, then E[θ|y] is again an increasing function in 
income. Panel C of Figure 1 graphs this relationship: 
 As in Case 1, politicians are hurt because voters cannot fully determine whether 
income is low because the politician has low skill or because of a weather shock.  
Result 3: If income is described as in equation (2), and voters do not observe 
rainfall shocks, then the probability of election increases with the quality of the weather.  
In addition, the model – as would any related model where weather is imperfectly 
observed as opposed to unobserved – predicts that high-quality incumbents would be hurt 
less by bad weather than low-quality incumbents. High-quality incumbents are better able 
to offset the consequences of the negative shock, and therefore the shock to income is 
less for these incumbents. 
Panel D of Figure 1 shows how the expectation of incumbent quality varies as a 
function of rainfall. The lines are steeper for lower-quality incumbents since their low 
quality is particularly revealed by their inability to stop the consequences of low rainfall. 
On the other hand, high-quality incumbents are still hurt by the negative shock to income, 
but the effect on expected competence is much smaller since they ameliorate much of the 
negative shock. 
Result 4: If politicians can mitigate rainfall shocks, as described in equation (2), 
and weather is unobservable, negative rainfall shocks hurt all politicians’ reelection 
chances, where θ <1. This effect is more pronounced for less effective politicians. 
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This result corresponds closely to our empirical results, where we find that 
incumbent politicians who respond vigorously with relief are hurt significantly less by 
negative rainfall shocks than politicians – of low competence in the context of the model 
– who respond less strongly. 
Finally, we consider the possibility that voters are “irrational,” in the sense that 
they believe that the data generating process is different from the true data generating 
process. To illustrate, suppose voters believe that income is generated in the following 
manner: 
y = -1 + 2 * θ + ε    (3) 
Including the constant -1 ensures that the range of possible incomes matches 
previous examples. This model might be explained by the well-documented “attribution 
bias,” in which individuals seek to attribute outcomes to actors who are identified, even if 
the actor in a situation has no control over the situation (Ross, 1977). In this simple 
irrational model, voters do not believe that weather affects income, hence whether 
weather is observed does not matter. 
















What is immediately clear from the model is that the reduced form relationship 
between rainfall and voter behavior is quite similar to Result 2 and Result 3: voters 
punish politicians for poor rainfall. 
Taken together, these results suggest that it may be difficult to distinguish 
between several plausible theories of voter behavior based on the observed relationship 
between rainfall and electoral performance. A finding of no relationship between rainfall 
and reelection prospects would support the model in which voters observe rainfall and 
unobservable ability does not interact with weather shocks. However, a broad range of 
alternative models yields the prediction that voters punish politicians for bad weather, 
and that this punishment may be rational or irrational. We thus focus on documenting the 
empirical relationships between weather, economic performance, and electoral support. 
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Our aim is not simply to determine whether voters respond to weather, but to use the 
richness of the data to describe nuances and features of this relationship that inform our 
understanding of political economy in emerging markets. 
 
III. Politics in India 
Previous Research on Indian Elections 
Several studies have exploited the richness of Indian electoral data. Linden (2004) 
uses a regression-discontinuity design to test for incumbency advantage in Indian 
national elections, finding that candidates enjoyed an incumbency advantage prior to 
1991, while suffering from an incumbency disadvantage in the subsequent period. 
Khemani (2001) examines voter behavior in state and national elections and finds that 
voters evaluate state politicians based on economic growth over their representative’s 
five-year term; in contrast, when evaluating national elections, they are influenced 
primarily by recent economic growth.  
Perhaps the work most closely related to the present paper is Afzal (2007), which 
studies rainfall and voting in South Asia. Afzal develops a model in which politicians 
who own land face a tradeoff between political effort and farm labor. When there is an 
incumbency disadvantage and good rainfall, politicians will not bother to govern well 
given the opportunity cost of agricultural production. Afzal tests this model using 
development fund spending in Pakistan, and variation in the profession of elected 
members of India’s lower parliament, finding support for the model – in other words, the 
rainfall/re-election link is sensitive to the incumbency (dis)advantage of the period.  
This paper differs from Afzal in several ways. We focus on state, rather than 
federal elections. Our time panel is substantially longer, and because state elections are 
staggered, we can control for national political trends by including state fixed-effects. 
Most importantly, drought and flood relief spending is organized at the state level. The 
goal of our paper is not to isolate one particular mechanism that can plausibly explain 
voter behavior, but rather to better understand the incentives faced by electoral officials 




In this paper we focus on state-level elections. State governments in India are responsible 
for most public goods in India, including agricultural infrastructure, health, education, 
and disaster relief. Our main measure of state responsiveness is state spending on disaster 
relief.  
 While we are unable to obtain detailed data on how disaster relief is spent, 
Rathore (2005) conducts an analysis of disaster relief in Rajasthan, a state that may be 
fairly representative of India, over the period 1999-2005. He finds the primary relief 
expenditures are on food aid, drinking water, fodder supply, and temporary employment 
schemes. 
 India has a federal system of government, with a bicameral national legislature, 
but typically unicameral state legislatures.3 Elections in India function on a first-past-the-
post system, with a seat going to the candidate who gets a plurality of votes. The number 
of seats per state ranges from 19 to 406, with an average of 136. Following the election, 
the governor of the state invites the party with the largest number of seats to form a 
government. If the party manages to form a majority, it becomes the ruling party. If not, 
the governor invites the next-largest party to form a ruling coalition. 
 The first state and federal elections were held in 1951, shortly after the 
promulgation of India’s constitution. Parliamentary elections are scheduled to occur at 
five-year intervals but, as in other parliamentary systems, may be called earlier.4  
 Direct election campaign expenditure is relatively restricted in India, as compared 
to the United States. In contrast, politically-motivated budget manipulation, and 
government-owned bank lending are important features of Indian elections that may aid 
incumbents seeking re-election (see Khemani, 2004, and Cole, 2009, for examples). In 
Russia, such manipulations have been shown to aid re-election (Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya, 2004). 
  
                                                 
3 A few states have upper houses, with indirect elections; for those states, we study the more important 
chamber, the popularly elected lower house. 
4 Elections may be called if the government loses a no-confidence vote. Alternatively, under article 356 of 
the constitution, the central government can declare “President’s Rule,” dismiss the state legislature and 
executive, and appoint a governor. This is meant to occur when “the Government of the State cannot be 
carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.” In practice, most of the instances of 
Governor’s rule follow a collapse of the ruling coalition (National Commission to Review the Working of 
the Constitution, 2002). 
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Politics and parties 
 The Indian National Congress Party, which led the independence movement, 
initially dominated Indian politics, ruling the federal parliament and most state 
assemblies following independence. After 1977, stronger opposition parties emerged, and 
Congress victories were no longer assured.  
Because, as noted by Chhiber and Kollman (1998), in any given electoral district 
there are usually two effective parties, we simplify analysis of state coalitions by coding 
parties that are part of the ruling coalition as “majority,” with all others serving as 
“opponents.” 
 
IV. Data and Empirical Specification  
Our dataset contains information about the voting decisions of 1.58 billion voters in 
21,532 electoral competitions in 28 Indian states over the period 1977-1999. We augment 
this dataset with information about rainfall, crop yields, population characteristics, and 
disaster relief spending. 
 Electoral data are from the Election Commission of India. Unless otherwise 
noted, we aggregate voting outcomes up from the constituency level to the district level.5  
There are 594 administrative districts. A district is an administrative unit within a state 
roughly equivalent to a U.S. county; the number of constituencies in a district ranges 
from 1 to over 50, with a median of 5. We begin our analysis in 1977, the period after 
which Congress victory was no longer assured. 
Rainfall data, gathered by Willmott and Matsuura (2001), provide monthly 
aggregate rainfall interpolated at the 0.5 degree level, or approximately 30 miles, which 
we match to districts.6 We account for spatial correlation of error terms by clustering 
results at the state-election level; the results are robust to clustering at the state level 
(available upon request). Data on agricultural output, from Sanghi, Kumar, and 
McKinsey (1998), provide the quantity, yield, and price for 25 of the most common 
                                                 
5 We do this to ensure our standard errors are conservative—we observe rainfall variation only at the 
district level. 
6 To match districts to rainfall, we calculate the centroid of each district using a 2001 GIS map. We then 
define a district's rainfall pattern as the grid point that is closest to the centroid. While this induces some 
measurement error, we are confident that the match is close. 
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agricultural crops in India. The dataset runs from 1950 to 1994; for the subsequent years, 
we use an updated version created by Rohini Pande.7 
Combining these datasets, we conduct all analysis, unless otherwise noted, at the 
district-election level.8  The unit of observation is, unless otherwise noted, the 
administrative district-election interaction. Finally, we note that disaster relief spending 
data are only available at the state level (for each year). Table 1 describes the summary 
statistics from our datasets. An average state election in our dataset had 156 seats. The 
most successful party won, on average, 56 percent of the seats in a state election. Only a 
plurality is necessary to win a constituency, and the winning candidate on average 
received approximately 48 percent of the vote. Finally, the incumbent ruling coalition 
won, on average, only 35 percent of votes in a constituency.  
Panel B describes the weather data. We use as our main measure of rainfall the 
total amount of rain falling in a district from June 1 to September 30, which roughly 
approximates the Kharif growing season. This monsoon period is the most important for 
agriculture. The average of mean rainfall across districts is approximately 995mm, with a 
standard deviation of 667mm. The median value of the standard deviation of rainfall 
within-district over our sample period is 609 mm, while the 25th percentile is 639 and the 
75th percentile 1176.  
Panel B also reports the share of variation in rainfall explained by year and district 
fixed-effects. While geography, unsurprisingly, explains substantial amount of variation 
in rainfall, it is worth noting that year fixed-effects alone explain only a tiny fraction of 
rainfall variation. The monsoon is not a uniform event; rather, there is substantial 
variation even within a year. 
 We adopt a general approach to map the quality of the monsoon to the value of 
agricultural output, using simple transformations of total rainfall occurring during the 
                                                 
7 Indian districts are periodically re-organized, typically by dividing one district into two districts. Thus, the 
number of districts increases over time. We map our electoral data and rainfall data to the most recent 
district boundaries (594 districts). The agricultural dataset was collected in a manner that maintains 
consistent data over the period 1950-1994, and therefore contains 272 districts per year. 
8 While the electoral data are available at the constituency level, we aggregate constituency outcomes to the 
district level to match the granularity of our other data sources. The original unit of observation for our 
analysis was the electoral constituency, rather than the administrative district, and our results are 
unchanged if we estimate at that level. 
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, where Raindt is the number of millimeters of rainfall during the 
kharif season, and dRain and sd are the mean and standard deviation of annual kharif 
rainfall within the district. The relationship between normalized rainfall and outcomes 
need not be linear: a quadratic specification allows for the possibility that excess rainfall 
may cause crop damage.10 
 Our second measure is the absolute deviation of normalized rainfall from the 





 . This second measure is meant to represent the 
degree to which rain varies from the optimal amount, measured in standard deviations 
from the district mean.11 The next section demonstrates that the optimal level of rainfall 
is about one standard deviation above the mean. 
 We are interested in the effect of weather events on three general classes of 
outcomes: crop yield, voting, and government response. The primary contribution of this 
paper is the elucidation of the relationship between weather, government, and voters. Of 
course, it is necessary first to verify that weather indeed affects crop yields. 
 We measure the relationship between rainfall and crop yield with the following 
regression, run on a panel of 272 districts over 32 years: 
 
  Yielddt = α + γd + t + β*Weatherdt + edt                                                                  (4) 
 
where Yielddt is a measure of the log value of a district’s crop output, and include fixed 
effects for district,d, and year, t . We weight the regressions by the number of votes in 
                                                 
9 While different crops have different rainfall requirements, farmers grow crops that are appropriate for 
their climatic region; we thus believe the most logical analysis maps total monsoon rainfall to crop output. 
10 Non-parametric estimation, not reported, suggests that a quadratic specification provides a good 
approximation of the true relationship between rainfall and voting, expenditures, and crop yield. 
11 These measures are very similar to the “Standardized Precipitation Index,” developed in McKee, 
Doesken, and Kleist (1993), and are consistent with agro-climatic models from test plots which tend to 
measure a linear relationship between rainfall and crop yield (See Allen et al. (1998), or Cole (2007) for an 
accessible discussion). As a robustness test (available from the author), we substitute the Standardized 
Precipitation Index for each district in each year, and find nearly identical results. 
 13
the district; the results are robust to non-weighted specifications (available upon request). 
As described previously, we use two different measures of weatherdt to ensure that our 
results are robust. Agronomic models indicate yield increases in rain up to an optimal 
point, at which point yields fall, as excess rainfall damages the crops. Thus, using the 
second measure, the absolute normalized deviation of rain from the optimal rainfall, we 
expect a negative and monotonic relationship. 
 Next, we estimate the relationship between weather and voting with the following 
equation: 
 
  VoteSharedct = α + γd + t + β*weatherdt-1 + edt                                                  (5) 
 
VoteSharedct is the vote share in a constituency c for the candidate from the incumbent 
ruling party. We use the previous year’s weather, as the main kharif season is from June 
to September, while the elections typically occur in February and March. Thus the rain in 
the calendar year before the election is the most salient.12 This equation will allow us to 
test, in the Indian context, the general hypothesis of Achen and Bartels (2004) and Healy 
(2009), that incumbents are punished for “acts of God” in the time leading up to their 
election. 
 To control for unobserved geographic heterogeneity, we estimate specifications 
including state fixed effects or district fixed effects. Our results are robust across 
specifications and all of our results hold when either state or district fixed effects (or 
neither) are included. In the following discussion, we focus on the results obtained by 
using district (and year) fixed effects; this specification controls for the most unobserved 
variation. 
 
V.  Are Indian Politicians Punished for Poor Rainfall? 
If American voters punish incumbents for such “acts of God” as shark attacks and 
droughts, then we might expect Indian voters might do the same for poor rains. This 
section repeats the basic Achen and Bartels tests in our Indian context. We find that 
abnormally low or high rain in a district leads to lower agricultural output. On average, 
                                                 
12 We will study the role of rainfall in two or more seasons before the election below. 
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severe weather costs the incumbent coalition a large share of the vote. Voters only punish 
their representative with fewer votes if they are from the same party as the ruling 
coalition in the state.  
 
Rainfall matters for yields 
 We first examine the relationship between severe weather and crop yields, as 
measured by the log value of agricultural output (in rupees).13 Table 2 tests variations of 
equation (4), using the natural log of the total value of crop yield as the dependent 
variable.14 As expected, all specifications indicate a strong relationship between rainfall 
and agricultural output. The magnitudes are large, and statistically significant; our 
preferred specification, which contains district fixed effects, yields a t-statistic above 4. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. Columns (1)-(2) present the linear 
relationship between normalized rainfall and output: the coefficient is positive and very 
statistically significant (t-statistics are given in parentheses). On average, a one standard 
deviation increase in rainfall results in a 3 to 4 percent increase in the value of output.  
In columns (3)-(4), we include a quadratic term in normalized rainfall. The linear 
term is positive, while the quadratic is negative, indicating that revenue increases to an 
optimal point (the optimum is reached around 0.97-1.62 standard deviations above the 
mean, depending on the specification, with the result being 1.27 standard deviations for 
the specification that includes district fixed effects). From this we assume an optimal 
amount of rainfall of one standard deviation above the mean in our second weather 
measure outlined in Section IV.15  
 Columns (5)-(6) measure how the value of output falls as rainfall departs from 
this optimum. Controlling for district effects and time effects, the specification in column 
(6) indicates that rain that is one standard deviation away from this optimum leads to a 
5.4 percent drop in agricultural output, on average. Since farmers typically pay a 
substantial cost to grow crops (seeds, fertilizer, etc.), a 5.4 percent variation in the value 
                                                 
13 Adjusting for inflation is not necessary, as all the regressions include year fixed-effects. 
14 We use the sum of the value of the 25 most common crops, as reported in the Willmott and Matsuura 
data. 
15 The optimal amount of rainfall does not vary significantly by state: all states fall within 0.5 to 1.5 
standard deviations above the mean. 
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of output likely implies a significantly higher amount of variation in a farmer’s net 
income. 
 It is important to note that adverse effects of this shock to agricultural output are 
not limited to land owners. While the effects on price are mitigated to some extent by 
government price controls, particularly for staples, the demand for agricultural labor is 
strongly correlated with rainfall: Jayachandran (2006) demonstrates that wage workers 
suffer significant reductions in wages during adverse weather shocks. 
  
Voters punish the ruling coalition for adverse rainfall 
 Poor weather reduces crop yields, which makes voters worse off, but also 
generates government response, providing tangible evidence of politicians’ desire and 
ability to help the public. What is the net effect of poor weather on support for the ruling 
party? In this section, we measure the effect of rainfall shocks on the vote share for the 
ruling party.  
We start by graphing the basic relationship between rainfall and voting behavior 
in India. Panel A of Figure 2 gives the average vote share of the ruling party by rainfall 
category: the bar graph gives the mean for each indicated bin; the line gives results from 
a non-parametric regression. The ruling party does very poorly during extreme droughts, 
but its performance increases steadily with rainfall, reaching an optimum at a point 
between 0 and 1 standard deviation above the mean. As rainfall exceeds this optimum, 
support for the ruling party declines. This relationship mirrors the relationship between 
rain and crop yields in the previous section. 
In Panel B of Figure 2, we present a falsification test, plotting the relationship 
between current rain and the vote share for the ruling party’s vote share in the previous 
election. For example, in Panel A the 1987 West Bengal electoral outcomes is correctly 
matched to 1986 weather; in Panel B, we instead match 1982 elections to 1986 weather. 
As expected, there is no effect of rain for this control group, confirming that there is 
nothing mechanical behind these relationships. 
 Table 3 presents regression results estimating the relationship between voting 
decisions and rainfall. The shape of the relationship between rain and the ruling party’s 
vote share closely resembles the shape of the relationship between rain and crop yields. 
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The coefficient on rain is positive and significant across all specifications; the coefficient 
on the quadratic term is negative and significant. Likewise, increases in the deviation of 
rain from the optimal amount causes incumbents to lose vote share. The results in 
columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 indicate that rainfall one standard deviation from the 
optimum causes a drop of more than 3 percentage points in the vote that the ruling party 
receives. The specification in column (6), which includes district fixed effects, gives an 
estimate that a one standard deviation worsening of the weather will cost the incumbent 
party 3.25 percentage points of the vote. Given that one-fourth of the contests in our 
sample are decided by a margin of 5.26 percentage points or less, rainfall is an important 
determinant of electoral outcomes. Voters appear to suffer an attribution bias, linking 
their rain-induced economic hardship to government behavior. 
 In the balance of this section, we examine which politicians are punished, and 
whether various groups of voters behave differently. 
 
Targeted disappointment 
There are two ways voters might express displeasure against politicians: simply 
by voting against their incumbent politician, no matter what her or his party is; or by 
voting against the state ruling coalition. Voters seeking a change in government would 
presumably vote in this latter fashion. 
Figure 3 graphs the ruling coalition’s vote share as a function of rainfall, for cases 
when the ruling party is also incumbent in the constituency (striped bar), and when the 
opposition is the incumbent party in the constituency (solid bar). In both cases, the same 
pattern obtains, but the ruling party’s vote share is much more sensitive to rainfall when it 
also controls the constituency. We test this formally in Table 4. We begin by replicating 
our analysis at the constituency (rather than district) level, separately estimating the effect 
of rainfall and relief spending on the electoral fortunes of the state ruling party or 
coalition. Consistent with the district level results, we find a large, negative effect: a one 
standard deviation shortfall in rain results in 3.8 percent fewer votes for the incumbent 
coalition. 
Splitting the sample into constituencies represented by the ruling coalition 
(columns (3) and (4)), and those in which an opposition member is an incumbent 
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(columns (5) and (6)), we find striking evidence in favor of the view that voters seek a 
change in government. Incumbents who are affiliated with the ruling coalition suffer an 
average 2.23 percentage-point loss of the vote following a one standard deviation rainfall 
shortfall, while incumbents who are not in the ruling coalition benefit from adverse 
rainfall, gaining an average of about 2 percentage points of the vote for each standard 
deviation by which rainfall deviates from the optimum.   
As a final check, we further break down the analysis to analyze separately 
constituencies in which the incumbent party is the leader of the ruling coalition and those 
in which the incumbent party is a member, but not the lead party, of the ruling coalition. 
We find negative and significant results for both of these subgroups (not reported), 
neither of which is statistically distinguishable from the point estimates reported in 
columns (3) and (4). 
These results are quite striking when seen in the context of dominant perceptions 
of patronage politics in developing countries. Observers of developing-country politics, 
particularly in less mature democracies than India’s, argue that weak parties limit the 
ability of the state to move beyond clientelistic behavior (e.g. van de Walle, 2003). 
Roninger (2004) describes the clientelist view:  
 
Those in control – the so-called patrons, sub-patrons and brokers – provide 
selective access to goods and opportunities and place themselves or their 
supporters in positions from which they can divert resources and services 
in their favour. Their partners – the so-called clients – are expected to 
return their benefactors’ help, politically and otherwise, by working for the 
patron at election times or boosting the patron’s prestige and reputation.  
 
 In the narrowest sense, this trading of political favors for votes occurs at the level 
at which the votes are delivered: the constituency. Yet the behavior exhibited by Indian 
voters to reward or punish the political party goes beyond this narrow view.  
By correctly (though not necessarily rationally) identifying the ruling party as the 
one worth blaming, rather than individual candidates representing their constituency, the 
Indian voters indicate that patronage politics are not just local. While the Congress Party 
is well known for its patronage tactics (Weiner, 1967), these results point towards what 
Weingrod referred to as “political-party directed patronage,” which, he argues, is 
indicative of greater state power and a development-oriented polity (1968).  
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In our data, not only are incumbents affiliated with the dominant party punished 
for bad rain, but those who are not affiliated gain votes by almost an equal amount. This 
gain is driven by the fact that elections are a zero-sum game, and one candidate’s loss is 
another candidate’s gain. Thus while we observe party- rather than politician-linked 
patterns of patronage, that several percentage points of the electorate can change 
allegiance after an adverse shock indicates that patronage politics—should they be 
reaching those swing voters—are driven not just by output, but by outcomes. 
 
Heterogeneous impact 
 The effect of rain need not be constant across time or space. An advantage of our 
setting is the very large number of elections, combined with detailed data at the district 
level, which allows us to test for heterogeneous effects.  
 Leigh (2009) shows that voters in more educated countries are less likely to 
reward their leaders for swings in the global economy beyond their leaders’ control. He 
interprets this as evidence that better informed voters are more rational. In Table 5, we 
investigate the possibility that different kinds of voter characteristics may predict a higher 
tendency to respond to the weather. We consider two characteristics: the share of farm 
households in a district and the literacy rate in a district. Each of these variables comes 
from the Indian Census, so we only observe data from the years 1971, 1981, and 1991. 
We use a district’s 1981 literacy rate to proxy for its literacy rate for each election from 
1981-1990. For each variable, we include the variable by itself as well as its interaction 
with the number of standard deviations of rain from the district optimal amount. For the 
interaction terms, we use the deviation of rainfall from its mean amount in the dataset. 
Centering the interaction does not affect the coefficient on the interaction term; it does 
allow estimation of the coefficient on the linear term at the mean value of rain. 
In columns (1) - (2), we present results for share involved in agriculture, columns 
(3) - (4) adds literacy rate, and (5) - (6) include each of these variables in the same 
specifications. Somewhat surprisingly, we find no significant effects, although the 
estimated coefficients have the expected signs. The point estimates suggest that farming 
districts may punish the incumbent more for weather shocks, and literate districts less.  
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In sum, the Indian data are consistent with U.S. and global data from different 
shocks: they describe an electorate that seems to punish incumbent politicians for acts 
beyond their control. We add to the existing literature by showing that not all incumbent 
politicians, but only those aligned with the ruling coalition, are punished. In the following 
section, we consider the possibility that response to crises might provide useful 
information to voters. 
  
VI. Are Governments Rewarded for Responding to Disasters? 
 
Governments are responsive 
 Our measurement of the relationship between rainfall and relief is similar to that 
for crop yield or voting in the previous section. As noted earlier, since district-level relief 
spending is not available, we use state-level data. The mean level of relief spending per 
capita was 10.3 rupees (approximately $0.32 today), with a standard deviation of 11.8. 
We regress the log of state expenditure on disaster relief, at the state level, on total state 
expenditure (excluding relief expenditure), state and year fixed effects, and lagged 
weather.  
 
  Reliefst = α + γs + t + *TotalSpendingst+ β*Weather st-1 + est                   (6) 
 
In the above equation, we take the mean of the weather variable across the state in 
a given year. We lag weather because the Indian fiscal year ends on March 31. Thus, 
relief spending for the 2000 fiscal year represents spending in the twelve months from 
April 1999 to March 2000. We therefore relate relief spending from April 1999 to March 
2000 to weather from May 1999 to October 1999, the most recent monsoon season. We 
expect our coefficients on weather to be the opposite from those in equation (4): more 
extreme weather should generate higher relief spending.16 Table 6 tests various 
specifications for equation (6), using the different definitions of weather outlined in 
Section IV. 
                                                 
16 Many states in India have a second growing season, called Rabi, in the winter. However, there is little 
rainfall during this time, and crops grown during Rabi typically depend either on irrigation or moisture 
retained in the soil from the Kharif rains. 
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 As Table 6 shows, state disaster relief spending does show the opposite 
relationship with rain from crop yields. The first two columns indicate that more rain, on 
average, is associated with less disaster relief. When a squared term for normalized 
district rainfall is included, we see that extreme amounts of rain lead to higher amounts of 
disaster spending. A minimum amount of disaster spending occurs at about one and a half 
standard deviations of rain above the mean in a district, as estimated in columns (3) and 
(4), consistent with our estimates of rain and agricultural yield, although the squared term 
in rain is not significant, suggesting that disaster expenditure particularly increases during 
droughts. The point estimates in columns (5) through (6) indicate that as rainfall moves 
one standard deviation further from the optimum, disaster spending goes up by 18-25 
percentage points. All of these relationships are statistically significant at standard levels. 
 
Do voters reward the government for responding to a crisis? 
 To determine how voters’ responses to extreme weather are affected by 
government response to that event, we look at natural disaster relief expenditure made by 
the government during the year of an election and interact it with the weather variable.17 
 
VoteSharedct = α + γd + t + β*weatherdt-1 + λ*reliefst + δ*weatherdt-1*reliefst + edt        (7) 
  
If voters do respond to the presence of disaster spending in the face of bad weather, then 
we would expect that δ would be positive in the above regressions.18  
 We note several caveats with these regressions. First, as mentioned, we observe 
relief spending only at the constituency level. Second, because we are unable to identify 
plausibly exogenous variation in government spending that is uncorrelated with rainfall, 
it is possible that the regression suffers from omitted variables bias: if more competent 
governments administer aid more effectively and also deliver more of it, we are unable to 
determine what fraction of the electoral boost from aid administration is due to general 
competence as opposed to aid delivery. Similarly, voters may demand things from the 
                                                 
17 We do not lag relief expenditures because they correspond to the fiscal year leading up to the calendar 
year – thus covering the rainy season under analysis.  
18 Khemani (2004) finds that overall state expenditure does not vary in election years, although the 
composition of taxes does.  
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government other than traditional relief, such as price subsidies or high-profile visits. 
These alternative palliative measures may be correlated with our measure of relief. 
 The first two columns of Table 7 report the results of estimating equation (7). We 
find that voters do indeed seem to reward politicians for disaster spending in response to 
extreme weather, with δ positive and consistently significant across all specifications. In 
the third and fourth column we perform the same analysis at the state level. Since it is 
limited to election years, the number of observations falls to 79, but even with that small 
sample the δ is positive, of a similar magnitude as with the district-level regressions, and 
marginally statistically significant (t-statistic of 1.74). 
 Of course, it is also possible that forward-looking incumbent parties strategically 
reallocate electoral (and patronage) spending in response to rainfall shocks, thereby 
mitigating the effect on their ability to form a ruling coalition. Columns (5) and (6) of 
Table 7 investigate this possibility. We estimate equation (7), but put "ruling coalition 
seat share" on the left hand side. The point estimates are large: -0.13 and -0.22, 
depending on whether we include state fixed effects, though only the latter estimate is 
statistically significant at the ten percent level, as the sample size is substantially smaller 
(79 observations). These large point estimates, though, are consistent with the fact that 
many elections in India are quite competitive: five percent of elections in our sample are 
decided by a margin of less than 1 percentage point of votes, while 25 percent are 
decided by a margin of five percentage points or less. These results suggest that state 
governments are not very effective in coordinating resources to eliminate the effect of 
voter discontent. 
To understand the magnitude of the coefficient estimate, consider the implied 
effect that rainfall becoming one standard deviation further from optimal has on disaster 
expenditure. With state effects, Table 6 indicates that rain becoming one standard 
deviation further from optimal leads to an increase in log disaster spending of 0.178. 
Combining this result with the estimate from column (2) of Table 7, we estimate that a 
party which responds to bad rainfall with an average increase in disaster spending (noting 
that the endogeneity concerns make this calculation less precise) will gain about 0.52 
percentage points of vote share (0.178*2.91) compared to a coalition that does not 
increase its disaster response when the weather shock occurs. Since a one standard 
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deviation worsening in weather costs the incumbent party 3.75 (column (2) of Table 4) 
percentage points of the vote share on average, failing to respond in the face of a crisis 
should lead to an average reduction of votes of 4.25 percent.  
 It should be stressed that these calculations examine local (district-level) response 
to state-wide disaster relief expenditures: more localized relief expenditure data are not 
available. We cannot, for example, observe the efficiency with which relief expenditures 
are disbursed. A government allocating relief to the hardest-hit areas may well receive a 
more favorable response from voters than a government seen as allocating relief to 
politically connected areas. Nevertheless, our sample includes a very diverse set of states, 
over quite a long period of time, and the point estimates we describe may be seen as 
average effects. 
Thus, the average disaster response, if correctly measured, offsets about one-
seventh of the electoral cost of the bad weather. Similarly, a government with a twice-
average response would offset about one-quarter of the cost of a rainfall shock. In other 
words, the weather still hurts the ruling coalition even when they respond vigorously, but 
less so. Voters do not filter out the entire effect of weather, but rather punish the ruling 
coalition for circumstances beyond its control. However, at least some voters do reward 
responsive governments, even if the electorate as a whole punishes them more for the 
negative events than it rewards them for the robust response. 
These results are related to the literature on political business cycles, which has 
provided evidence that, particularly in the United States, governments increase spending, 
or loosen monetary policy, prior to elections. In India, the evidence appears to be mixed. 
While Cole (2009) found that agricultural credit was expanded before elections, Khemani 
(2004) examined state political spending and found no change in the level of spending (or 
taxation). She does find some evidence of a compositional shift in taxes related to 




 As our framework illustrates, the response to a rainfall shock is not the only signal 
that the voter observes. Our finding that voters are more likely to reelect an incumbent 
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who has responded well to an emergency may result from our measure of government 
responsiveness (rainfall shock interacted with relief spending) being correlated with the 
general competence level of the state government. After all, a government that responds 
well to one crisis may just be a better government, and therefore do better at the ballot 
box for a whole host of reasons; crisis management might play only a small part. While 
this alternative interpretation is consistent with the broader theme of the paper, two pieces 
of evidence suggest that our narrower, crisis-management story is correct. 
 First, in Appendix Table 1 we add a number of controls at the state level to our 
preferred specification in Table 7 that should be correlated with general government 
competence. None of these variables—state GDP growth, change in cash balances, and 
budget deficits—is a perfect measure of government behavior; yet they are likely 
correlated with voters’ perception of the quality of government. As can be seen in the 
table, the addition of these controls has little impact on the coefficient of rainfall shock 
interacted with relief spending: it is still statistically and economically quite significant. 
Second, in Appendix Table 2 we add controls for political parties, to account for 
any systematic difference in administrative abilities across political parties. The results 
are consistent with those reported previously. Column (1) includes an indicator variable 
for whether Congress is the coalition leader; column (2) includes dummies for the three 
largest parties, INC (Congress), BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), and JNP (Janata Party), 
and column (3) includes fixed-effects for all parties. In all cases, the coefficient on 
(rainfall SDs from optimal last year) * (relief expenditure last year) remains statistically 
significant, though the precision of the main effects declines when a fixed effect is 
included for every ruling coalition party identity. 
 
VII.  Strategic Government 
The model in Section II assumed a benevolent government that, if competent, would 
respond to a crisis by distributing relief aid. A simple test of government response to 
crisis—and the voters’ reaction at the polls—was consistent with that view, although it 
remains possible that more complex strategies might be at play.  
In this section we explore how voting behavior responds to weather not just in 
year prior to the election, but in earlier periods as well. This test is motivated by the well-
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documented “recency” bias, identified in the psychology literature for over a century 
(Calkins 1896). Individuals consistently put greater weight on more recent events, even in 
situations where more recent events are no more informative than earlier events. Similar 
effects have long been observed with respect to voters’ responses to the events they 
observe as well (Fair 1978, Caplan 2007, Bartels 2008). While general government 
competence may well be correlated with the quality of crisis response, it is unlikely to be 
the case that this correlation exists only in the year before the election. On the other hand, 
voters may be better at recollecting government responses to crises that occurred more 
recently. We first establish that the recency bias exists in the electorate’s response to 
crises, then test the hypothesis that governments respond more vigorously with relief 
when the electoral rewards for doing so are greater. 
In Table 8, we present strong evidence for the recency bias, by considering 
separately rainfall the year prior to the election and rainfall in the year before that. 
Columns (1) and (2) provide strong evidence of this bias: rainfall from more than one 
year prior to the election does not affect the electorate’s decision. In results that are 
available on request, we document that there is no relationship between rainfall two, 
three, or four years prior to an election, and electoral outcomes. However, no matter how 
many earlier years are included, the year before the election continues to enter in a 
statistically and economically significant manner. 
Similarly, we find that, two years prior to a reelection, there is no relationship 
between vote share for the incumbent coalition and our measure of responsiveness, the 
interaction between relief expenditure and rainfall (columns (3) and (4)). If our measures 
were picking up general competence of the government, we might expect the same 
relationship throughout the electoral cycle, or for the coefficient on responsiveness in the 
year prior to the election to diminish. Yet we find that the coefficient on recent crisis 
response maintains its magnitude and significance, while for earlier years it is 
economically and statistically insignificant. This amounts to a rejection of our hypothesis 
that voters will use information from all available years of crisis response. Since voters 
are unlikely to observe multiple crises during the same period of office, this is strong 
evidence that this simple psychological bias causes significant failures in voters’ 
collective abilities to hold elected officials accountable for their actions. 
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This voter bias gives us an opportunity to test for non-naïve government relief. 
After all, if voters do not demand responsiveness of the government after particular crises 
(those, in this case, that do not occur in the year preceding an election), then the 
government may choose not to allocate resources towards disaster relief. Table 9 
examines government spending on relief to bad rainfall, comparing election years with 
non-election years. 
The first two columns in Table 9 repeat the main specifications in the first two 
columns of Table 6. With state and year fixed effects, we find that for each standard 
deviation by which rain deviates from the optimal amount, the government increases its 
disaster spending by 18 log points, or 19 percent. However, in columns (5) and (6), when 
we restrict attention to only election years, we find point estimates that are substantially 
higher than those in previous columns. In election years—when voters might be expected 
to pay more attention—the government’s generosity rises. In columns (3) and (4), we use 
all available data and include election year dummies as well as an interaction between 
election year and rainfall. The main effect is statistically significant, and the interaction 
term economically large and positive, but the interaction term is not statistically 
distinguishable from zero. We therefore take this as suggestive rather than definitive on 
this point. 
While we cannot measure constituent welfare, it is quite likely that any strategic 
behavior of this sort is welfare-reducing: if the marginal returns to disaster relief decline 
with the level of spending, then voters may be better off when relief is targeted at years of 
severe drought, rather than years prior to an election. 
Finally, we acknowledge an important caveat: if politician ability is highly time-
varying, it may be rational for voters to pay more attention in the year immediately prior 
to the election. However, our estimate of a zero-effect two years before is relatively 
precise (we can rule out an effect of -1 percentage point, less than one-third the size of 
the electoral-year effect). If political ability changed this quickly, a forward-looking 
model of voting may not be appropriate. 
We find evidence suggesting political opportunism in the time-series of aid 
provision: what about the cross-section? While Table 5 showed that voter response to 
rainfall shocks did not vary by voter sophistication, it is possible that voter 
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appreciativeness of government spending varies by sophistication. To test this hypothesis, 
we augment equation (7) with measures of district-level literacy, relief interacted with 
literacy, rain interacted with literacy, and a triple interaction relief * literacy * rain. In 
results we do not report (but which are available on request), we find that these additional 
terms are economically small and statistically insignificant. 
What about politically-motivated targeting? As noted, we do not observe the exact 
geographies to which aid is targeted.  It is, however, worth considering how the 
possibility of politically-motivated targeting may affect our results. If the voting 
population is risk-averse, optimal targeting would suggest that harder-hit areas should 
receive more relief than less-hard hit areas. It also seems reasonable that voters would 
provide the greatest reward to relief expenditure when it is most needed. However, it is 
worth noting that voters appear to respond substantially even to targeted spending that is 
largely pork (see, e.g., Levitt and Snyder, 1997). Empirically, it is an open question to 
what extent voters respond to spending that is more essential in comparison to spending 
that is more politically oriented. 
If aid relief is simply pork distributed to regions in which the ruling coalition 
enjoys natural support, then areas that do not support the ruling coalition (e.g., opposition 
seats) would punish incumbent politicians’ areas more than areas which strongly support 
the ruling coalition. We certainly did not observe this result in Table 4.  
Regardless of the actual targeting used, our regression results give the average 
electoral response of voters. An interpretation of the fact that the electoral rewards to 
spending appear to be small is consistent with the idea that the aid is targeted not 
according to need, but rather towards areas that already support the ruling coalition. Thus, 
if voters actually do reward politically-oriented spending less than more essential 
spending, a government could potentially obtain higher electoral returns from relief 
spending by allocating those funds to areas that were more affected by disasters. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 This paper addresses longstanding questions about the relationship between 
exogenous events and political fortunes, studying tens of thousands of elections in India. 
We begin by outlining a simple framework to think about the problem. We first show that 
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voters may rationally punish politicians following negative shocks over which the 
politician has no control. This makes it difficult to isolate hypotheses about rationality in 
voters per se; however, it nonetheless provides an ideal setting to study the relationship 
between elected leaders and their constituents. 
 Using detailed weather, electoral, and relief data from India, we test hypotheses 
on electoral outcomes and government responsiveness to exogenous events. We find 
evidence that voters indeed punish incumbent politicians for economically significant 
events beyond the politician’s control. Rainfall just one standard deviation from the 
optimal level reduces the incumbent coalitions vote share by 3.25 percentage points. The 
results are precisely estimated, using a conservative estimation technique which 
aggregates data to the district level and correct standard errors for clustering. We then use 
the richness of our data to shed light to the nuances of voter behavior, with four important 
and novel results.  
 First, we note that voters appear to be targeting their dissatisfaction: incumbent 
politicians who are members of the ruling coalition are punished severely following poor 
rainfall: a one-standard deviation decline in rainfall results in 2.6 percent fewer votes. In 
contrast, opposition incumbent legislators benefit from a 1.9 percentage point increase in 
voters for the same drop in rainfall. These results are important, because they suggest that 
traditional models of geography-based patronage thought to apply in the developing 
world may not accurately describe voting in India. 
 Second, we study whether voter characteristics mediate how voters respond to 
shocks. Some authors have posited that more sophisticated voters may be more able to 
process information, correctly assigning blame and credit to politicians for circumstances 
depending within the politicians’ control, while filtering out exogenous events (e.g., 
Gomez and Wilson 2001). However, we find that voters’ response to rainfall shocks does 
not vary with their level of education, nor even with the fraction of voters who are 
directly involved in agricultural production. These non-effects are precisely measured. 
Third, we examine how voters’ response to rainfall shocks varies with relief 
spending. Analyzing state-level natural disaster relief, we find that voters indeed punish 
governments less for poor weather when the government responds aggressively, but this 
mitigating effect is small. While we do not observe what drives variation in response, we 
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find it striking that even the most responsive governments suffer electorally following a 
bad rainfall shock. 
Finally, we examine whether voters weigh all available information equally when 
evaluating governments in the wake of shocks. We find they do not: rainfall shocks in the 
year before an election hurt politicians, but rainfall in the year previous to that have no 
effect on the political fortunes of the incumbents. Similarly, we observe that relief 
spending two years prior to the election is not rewarded at all. This result is consistent 
with a model in which voters have limited memory. 
Overall, these results tie together the findings of the literature on relief provision 
in democracies and voter irrationality. In democratic contexts, governments respond to 
crises with government-supplied relief, but the degree to which they do so depends on the 
likely electoral return. Besley and Burgess (2002) noted that governments were more 
generous with relief to literate districts and those with more media outlets. Such a 
strategy plays to the intelligence and watchfulness of an electorate. We bring to this 
analysis a different strategy: since Indian voters, on average, punish their leaders for 
events beyond their control, we examine whether such behavior might feed into the 
provision of relief in India. The government’s sharper focus on relief during election 
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 Elections Data: Elections data are from the Election Commission of India, a quasi-
judiciary body set up to administer state and national elections in 1950. Data are available on 
their website http://www.eci.gov.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp. For elections not 
available as electronic datasets, we used Stata programs to convert the pdf files to Stata datasets. 
 Rainfall: Rainfall data are from Willmott and Matsuura, “Terrestrial Air Temperature 
and Precipitation: Monthly and Annual Climatologies,” version 3.02, 2001:  
http://climate.geog.udel.edu/~climate/html_pages/README.ghcn_clim2.html. The database 
provides rainfall at a .5 degree by .5 degree grid. A degree of latitude is approximately 69 miles. 
 District: We use the database Indian District Data, compiled by Vanneman and Barnes 
(2000), for information on literacy and urbanization at the district level. The data are available at: 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/socy/vanneman/districts/home/citations.html 
 Agricultural Output: Agricultural output data come from Sanghi, Kumar, and 
McKinsey (1998), available here: http://chd.ucla.edu/dev_data/datafiles/india_agric_climate.htm. 
The updated dataset was obtained from Rohini Pande (Harvard University). 
 Electoral Constituencies: Electoral constituencies were mapped to districts using the 
1977 “Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order,” issued by the Election  
Commission of India.  
Data on coalitions were obtained for all elections in which a single party did not capture 
more than 50% of the votes, from contemporary news reports (typically the Times of India).  
During the period covered by our data, constituency boundaries were stable, allowing us 
to match constituencies over time and thus identify the political affiliation of the incumbent . Of 
the 21,532 elections in our data, we are able to identify the incumbent party in 17,744 elections. 
We cannot identify the incumbents following state political reorganizations, which resulted in the 
creation of entirely new legislative assemblies for the new states. 
 Disaster relief spending: We use data compiled from state budgets, reported in various 
issues of the Reserve Bank of India Annual Bulletin. Data prior to 1992 were compiled by Robin 
Burgess and Stuti Khemani. We obtained data for 1993 onwards from the website of the Reserve 
Bank of India. 
 Calamity data are from Robin Burgess, and were the basis of Besley and Burgess (2002). 
Burgess’ website provides the data from 1951-1996. 
  
Figure 1: Inference of Politician Quality from Observed Outcomes
Figure 1a. This figure graphs the expected value of politician ability, 
when the weather shock v is observable, as a function of y, when 
unobserved ability θ = 0.50, and the unobserved idiosyncratic shock 
ε=0.50. An increase in v has no effect on the expected value of θ.
Figure 1b. This figure graphs the expected value of politician ability, 
when the weather shock v is unobservable, for the case when 
unobserved ability θ=0.50. For a given idiosyncratic shock ε, an 
increase in v increases the voters' expected value of the politicians 
ability.
Figure 1c. This figure graphs the expected value of politician ability, 
when the weather shock v is unobservable and more able 
politicians are able to better mitigate the effects of the shock, as a 
function of y, for the case when unobserved ability θ = 0.50.
Figure 1d. This figure graphs the expected value of politician ability 
when the weather shock v is unobservable and more able 
politicians are able to better mitigate the effects of the shock, as a 
function of v, for the case when unobserved ability θ = 0.50.
Figure 1e. This figure graphs the expected value of politician ability 
by an irrational voter, who does not recognize that rainfall shocks 
affect income, as a function of y, for the case where θ = 0.50.
Figure 2: Rainfall and Incumbent Coalition Voteshare
Panel A: Raw relationship between rainfall in a district in the previous year, and 
average vote share of incumbent coalition
Panel B: Falsification Exercise. Raw relationship bewteen rainfall in a district in 
the previous year, and average vote share of incumbent coalition in the 














































































Number of standard deviations from district mean
Figure 3: Rainfall and support for incumbent candidates, by coalition affiliation
The figure presents the raw relationship between vote share for the ruling coalition and rainfall, according to 
whether the coalition is incumbent in the constituency. The striped bars indicate vote share for the coalition when 
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A. Voting variables 
Number of seats contested in an election 155.9 112.8
Percentage of seats won by top party 56.0 15.6
Vote percentage for winning candidate in a constituency 48.1 11.0
Vote percentage for the ruling coalition in a constituency 35.3 15.5
B. District-Level Rainfall Measure
Kharif (June - September) rainfall in mm 995 667
Standard deviation across districts (average Kharif rainfall) 91
Fraction of rainfall variance explained by district fixed-effects .804
 (R2 of regression with district FE)
Fraction of rainfall variance explained by year fixed-effects .018
 (R2 of regression with year FE)
Fraction of rainfall variation explained by district and year fixed-effects .823
 (R2 of regression with year FE)
Percentage of observations for which rainfall is more
than two standard deviations from the optimal amount
Percentage of observations for which rainfall is more
than three standard deviations from the optimal amount
C. Disaster expenditure
Per-capita average expenditure (Rs/person) 10.3 11.8
Table 1: Summary statistics
18.3%
1.1%
Dependent variable: Log of total crop value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Normalized Kharif Rainfall .0381 .035 .046 .0449
(Rain from June to September) (4.41) (5.85) (4.76) (6.62)
(Normalized Kharif Rainfall)^2 -.0142 -.0177
(-2.61) (-4.69)
Standard deviations of kharif rain -.0584 -.0538
from optimal (-4.95) (-6.74)
State dummies? Y N Y N Y N
District dummies? N Y N Y N Y
R-squared .34 .878 .341 .879 .341 .878
N 14108 14108 14108 14108 14108 14108
Notes:
1) The rain variables are all standardized by subtracting the district mean and dividing by the district standard deviation.
2) t -statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state*year level.
3) All regressions include year dummies.
4) The major crops are wheat, bajra, maize, rice, and jowar.  All of these except wheat are primarily kharif crops.
Table 2: Effect of rain on crop yields (1956-1987)
Dependent variable: Vote share in the district for the incumbent coalition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Kharif rain .0253 .0229 .0291 .0275
(Rain from June to September) (2.92) (2.27) (3.2) (2.62)
Kharif rain^2 -.0073 -.0092
(-2.17) (-2.33)
Standard deviations of kharif rain -.0331 -.0325
from optimal (-3.29) (-2.77)
State dummies? Y N Y N Y N
District dummies? N Y N Y N Y
R-squared .355 .452 .359 .458 .355 .454
N 2091 2091 2091 2091 2091 2091
Notes:
1) The rain variables are all standardized by subtracting the district mean and dividing by the district standard deviation.
2) t- statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state*year level.
3) All regressions include year dummies.
4) Regressions are weighted by the number of votes in the district.
Table 3: Effect of weather on vote for the ruling coalition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standard deviations of kharif rain -.038 -.0375 -.0223 -.0255 .0203 .0191
from optimal (-3.56) (-3.32) (-2.45) (-2.68) (2.01) (1.51)
State dummies? Y N Y N Y N
District dummies? N Y N Y N Y
R-squared .14 .184 .41 .433 .288 .365
N 21532 21532 17994 17994 4656 4656
Notes:
1) The rain variables are all standardized by subtracting the district mean and dividing by the district standard deviation.
2) t- statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state*year level.
3) All regressions include year dummies.
4) Regressions are weighted by the number of votes in the constituency.
Table 4: Affiliation with Ruling Coalition and the Effect of Weather on Electoral Outcomes
Incumbent legislator, 
where legislator is 
member of ruling 
coalition
Incumbent legislator, 
where legislator is not 
part of ruling coalition
For all parties in 
ruling coalition
Constituency level vote shares:
Dependent variable: Vote share in the district for the ruling coalition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standard deviations of rain from optimal -.0346 -.0328 -.0377 -.0389 -.0377 -.0379
(Rain in June-September year before the election) (-3.49) (-2.79) (-3.27) (-2.67) (-3.01) (-2.43)
District farm share .0313 -.3045 .0253 -.4291
(.96) (-1.6) (.33) (-2.19)
District farm share*Standard -.0106 -.0367 .0027 -.0084
deviations of rain from optimal (-.42) (-1.11) (.06) (-.14)
District literacy rate -.0485 .0303 -.0146 -.2106
(-.67) (.08) (-.11) (-.52)
District literacy rate*Standard .0265 .0587 .0297 .0541
deviations of rain from optimal (.53) (.94) (.36) (.56)
State dummies? Y N Y N Y N
District dummies? N Y N Y N Y
R-squared .36 .46 .356 .456 .356 .459
N 2063 2063 2026 2026 2026 2026
Notes:
1) The rain variables are all standardized subtracting the district mean and dividing by the district standard deviation.
2) t- statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state*year level.
3) All regressions include year dummies.
4) Regressions are weighted by the number of votes in the district.
Table 5: Voter Characteristics and the Relationship Between Rainfall and Electoral Support
Dependent variable: Log of State per-capita natural calamity relief expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Kharif rain -.1726 -.1289 -.1914 -.1429
(Rain from June to September) (-3.04) (-2.41) (-3.12) (-2.47)
Kharif rain^2 .0681 .0489
(1.32) (1.00)
Standard deviations of kharif rain .2458 .1775
from the optimal (3.00) (2.28)
State dummies? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies? N Y N Y N Y
R-squared .657 .691 .658 .692 .657 .691
N 551 551 551 551 551 551
Notes:
1) The rain variables are all standardized by subtracting the district mean and dividing by the district standard deviation.
2) t- statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state level.
3) Each regression includes a control for total expenditure in the state.
Table 6: Rain's effect on disaster spending (1960-1999)
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standard deviations of kharif rain -.0386 -.036 -.0706 -.0791 -0.1360 -0.2218
from optimal last year (-4.08) (-3.28) (-2.14) (-2.97) (-1.03) (-1.71)
ln (relief expenditure last year) .0063 .0077 .0095 .0012 -0.0001 0.0768
(.35) (.38) (.55) (.05) (0.00) (0.75)
ln (relief expenditure last year) * .0222 .0291 .0313 .0373 -0.0332 -0.0783
standard deviations from optimal last year (2.35) (3.3) (1.24) (1.74) (-0.79) (-1.44)
State dummies? Y N N Y N Y
District dummies? N Y N N N N
R-squared .387 .503 .373 .578 0.418 0.644
N 1756 1756 79 79 79 79
Notes:
2) t- statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the
state*year level.
3) All regressions include year dummies.
4) Regressions are weighted by the number of votes in the district.







District Level State Level
1) The rain variables are all standardized by subtracting the district mean and dividing by the district 
standard deviation.
State Level
Dependent variable: Vote share in the district for the ruling coalition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard deviations of kharif rain -.0335 -.0325 -.0383 -.0356
from optimal last year (-3.32) (-2.78) (-4.2) (-3.39)
ln (relief expenditure last year) .0139 .0149
(.71) (.69)
ln (relief expenditure last year) * .0229 .0295
standard deviations from optimal last year (2.45) (3.45)
Standard deviations of kharif rain .0094 .0101 .0084 .0059
from optimal two years previous (1.03) (1.05) (.92) (.62)
ln (relief expenditure two years previous) -.0061 -.008
(-.31) (-.38)
ln (relief expenditure two years previous) * -.0091 -.0075
standard deviations from optimal two years previous (-1.19) (-.99)
State dummies? Y N Y N
District dummies? N Y N Y
R-squared .356 .456 .393 .508
N 2091 2091 1756 1756
Notes:
1) The rain variables are all standardized subtracting the district mean and dividing by 
the district standard deviation.
2) t- statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the
state*year level.
3) All regressions include year dummies.
4) Regressions are weighted by the number of votes in the district.
Table 8: Weather, voting, and relief expenditure
Dependent variable: Log of State per-capita natural calamity relief expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Kharif rain -.1726 -.1289
(Rain from June to September) (-3.04) (-2.41)
Kharif rain^2
Standard deviations of kharif rain .2206 .1389
from the optimal (2.27) (1.47)
Election dummy   -.0652 -.1415
(-.27) (-.63)
Election*Standard deviations of .101 .1533 .3891 .4533
kharif rain from optimal (.54) (.86) (2.39) (2.98)
State dummies? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies? N Y N Y N Y
R-squared .657 .691 .658 .692 .688 .745
N 551 551 551 551 128 128
Notes:
1) The rain variables are all standardized by subtracting the district mean and dividing by the district standard deviation.
2) t- statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state level.
3) Each regression includes a control for total expenditure in the state.
Table 9: Rain's effect on disaster spending (1960-1999)
Dependent variable: Vote share in the district for the ruling coalition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard deviations of kharif rain -.0296 -.0267 -.0282 -.0246
from optimal last year (-2.84) (-2.34) (-2.64) (-2.12)
ln (relief expenditure last year) .007 .0102 .0054 .0061
(.36) (.48) (.29) (.29)
ln (relief expenditure last year) * .0249 .0268 .0203 .0276
standard deviations from optimal last year (2.85) (2.42) (1.7) (2.65)
State GDP growth in the previous year .3003 .3024 .3507 .3669
(1.28) (1.25) (1.63) (1.51)
Change in cash balances (in thousands) -.0015 -.0014 -.0011
(-.7) (-.74) (-.53)




State dummies? N N N N
District dummies? Y Y Y Y
R-squared .512 .496 .396 .507
N 1756 1605 1605 1605
Notes:
1) The rain variables are all standardized subtracting the district mean and dividing by 
the district standard deviation.
2) t- statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the
state*year level.
3) All regressions include year dummies.
4) Regressions are weighted by the number of votes in the district.
Appendix Table 1: Weather, voting, and relief expenditure (controlling for good government)
Dependent variable: Vote share in the district for the ruling coalition
(1) (2) (3)
Standard deviations of kharif rain -.0273 -.018 -.0064
from optimal last year (-2.35) (-1.49) (-.76)
ln (relief expenditure last year) .0054 .0093 -.0144
(.30) (.54) (-1.03)
ln (relief expenditure last year) * .0191 .021 .0217
standard deviations from optimal last year (2.77) (2.30) (2.72)
R-squared .543 .564 .667
Party Fixed Effects INC Party INC, BJP, JNP All parties
N 1756 1756 1756
Notes:
2) t- statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state*year level.
3) All regressions include year dummies.
4) Regressions are weighted by the number of votes in the district.
Appendix Table 2: Rainfall and Incumbent Support, Controlling for Party Identity
5) Column (1) includes a dummy indicating whether Congress (INC) was the coalition leader; column (2) 
includes a dummy for each of the three larest parties, INC, BJP, and JNP; and column (3) includes a separate 
dummy variable for each party that was a coalition leader.
1) The rain variables are all standardized subtracting the district mean and dividing by the district standard 
deviation.
